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RECENT CASES
Carriers-
INTERSTATE COMMERCE ACT-TOLERANCE
SUSTAINED AS REASONABLE REGULATION
The Interstate Commerce Commission approved railroad tariffs for
shipments of shell eggs which imposed a "tolerance," a fixed percentage
of the shipment which is assumed to be damaged because of the perish-
able nature of the article; this percentage is deducted from all claims for
loss filed with the carrier. As an alternative, the schedules permitted the
shipper to utilize federal or state inspection to determine the exact amount
of damage which was present before delivery to the carrier, and to substi-
tute this sum, plus one per cent for further unavoidable damage in
transit, for the tolerance.' Various shippers and the Department of Agri-
culture sued to annul the ICC order, alleging that it limited carrier lia-
bility in violation of the Interstate Commerce Act.2 The court held the
imposition of a general tolerance was a reasonable regulation merely
fixing the amount of damage which the carrier did not cause. Utah Poul-
try & Farmers Cooperative v. United States, 119 F. Supp. 846 (D. Utah
1954).
Section 20(11) of the Interstate Commerce Act provides that a com-
mon carrier shall be liable ". . . for the full actual loss, damage or injury
to such property caused by it . . . notwithstanding any limitation of lia-
bility or limitation of the amount of recovery or representation or agree-
ment as to the value in any such receipt or bill of lading or in any tariff
filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission. . . ." Damage present
on delivery to the carrier 3 or loss caused during transit by the inherent
nature of the goods has been deducted in claims against the railroad 4
despite the carrier's strict common law liability. In several cases where the
carrier was found to have been negligent, the courts permitted a deduction
for unavoidable damage, but the amount was determined by the evidence
1. Special Regulations, Eggs, 284 I.C.C. 377 (1952). The schedules provide
for a three per cent tolerance on eggs packed at the rail point of origin and five
per cent on those processed at other points.
2. 24 STAT. 386 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §20(11) (1952).
3. H. P. Richards & Sons v. Director General of Railroads, 160 La. 1019, 107
So. 891 (1926); accord, Delphi Frosted Foods Corp. v. Illinois Cent. Ry., 188
F.2d 343 (6th Cir. 1951).
4. Austin v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 188 F.2d 239 (5th Cir. 1951); Shapiro
v. Pennsylvania R.R., 83 F.2d 581 (D.C. Cir. 1936); Singer v. Ameican Express
Co., 203 Mo. App. 158, 219 S.W. 662 (1920), cert. deided, 254 U.S. 632 (1920);
MILLzR, LAW OF FREIGHT Loss & DAMAGE CLAIMS 138 (1953). But cf. Akerly v.
Railway Express Agency, 96 N.H. 396, 77 A.2d 856 (1951) (freezing of eggs was
held not to be inherent in their nature).
(113)
114 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 103
in the individual case and was not a fixed sum to be utilized in all cases
dealing with that article.5 Weight tolerances, based partly on inaccurate
weighing rather than any real loss and partly on natural shrinkage of the
article, have been authorized by the ICC,6 but under such a tolerance a
New Jersey court held that, once the shipper has shown loss, the carrier
must establish that it did not cause the loss. 7 The Supreme Court, in
Chicago, M. & St. Paul Ry. v. McCaull-Dinsmore Co.,8 interpreted
§ 20(11) to invalidate a condition in the bill of lading that the carrier's lia-
bility shall be based on "the value of the property at the place and time of
shipment." The Court reasoned that, since the value of the property rose
during transportation, the shipper was prevented from recovering "full
actual loss." Although certain types of eggs, constituting a small portion
of the market, have been subject to a damage tolerance for a number of
years,9 neither its legality, nor that of the general tolerance applicable to
all eggs, had been challenged in the courts before the instant case.
Since the tolerance is only an average, its application to shipments
which contained less than the stated percentages of damage before transit
and which were destroyed by the carrier's negligence can violate the re-
quirement of § 20(11) that payment shall be for full actual loss.'0  The
majority relied upon the Commission's determination that these were -rea-
sonable regulations, citing various rate cases as precedent for upholding
the Commission's findings.-" However, these broad discretionary powers
with respect to rates have not been granted to the Commission in the
section dealing with limitation of liability.12 This authority cannot be im-
plied, since § 20(11) provides that any limitation of liability, though part
of a tariff filed with the ICC, shall be unlawful. Moreover, the omission
seems intentional because one of the provisos of § 20(11) does grant the
Commission such authority in another context.13 When the Supreme Court
5. Meltzer v. Pennsylvania R.R., 29 F. Supp. 840 (E.D. Pa. 1939); 38 F. Supp.
391 (E.D. Pa. 1941); Bronstein v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 29 F. Supp. 837 (E.D.
Pa. 1939).
6. Weight Tolerance Rule, 192 I.C.C. 71 (1933).
7. Joseph Toker Co. v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 12 N.J. 608, 97 A.2d 598 (1953).
"Neither the carrier nor the Commission could lawfully provide that liability to
the shipper for loss of coal in transit shall not accrue until the loss exceeds 112%
of the coal shipped." Id. at 615, 97 A.2d at 602. See Thompson v. James G.
McCarrick Co., 205 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1953) on the carrier's burden as to the cause
of the shortage; cf. Claims for Loss and Damage of Grain, 56 I.C.C. 347, 352
(1920).
8. 253 U.S. 97 (1920).
9. National Poultry, Butter & Eggs Ass'n v. New York Cent. R.R., 52 I.C.C. 47
(1919).
10. Instant case at 867 (dissenting opinion).
11. Instant case at 861, 862.
12. Compare the grants of authority to the Commission in establishing rates,
routes and fares in 54 STAT. 911, 49 U.S.C. § 15 (Supp. 1953) with the absence
of such power in 49 U.S.C. §20(11) (1952).
13. The Act provides that notwithstanding the provisions charging the carrier
with liability for full actual loss, the ICC may make reasonable orders authorizing
the carrier to establish rates based on the declared value of the property, which
would be the amount recoverable in the event of loss. 49 U.S.C. §20(11) (1952).
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interpreted § 20(11) in the McCaull-Dinsmore case, it did not feel bound
by the Commission's determination of reasonableness, although the con-
dition in the bill of lading would not prevent recovery of full actual loss
if the value of the property did not rise during transportation. 14
The background of the Interstate Commerce Act shows clearly that
§ 20(11) was incorporated to protect the shipper.15 The court rejected
increased rates as an alternative solution to the railroad's substantial prob-
lem of large damage claims for eggs, 16 but the practical effect of the toler-
ance is to increase the shipper's cost of transportation. If the courts
were to take judicial notice that the ICC tolerance represents damage
which the carrier did not cause,17 the shipper would be unable to challenge
its application in his case. Even if the shipper were permitted to show that
he shipped with less than tolerance damage, as in a New Jersey case, 18
he would have to establish that an actual loss occurred during transporta-
tion. This may be a difficult burden since not all damage is discoverable
on inspection and since handling in the repacking and candling operations
increases the amount of damage present before rail transportation. When
this procedure is contrasted with the usual practice of speedy claim set-
tlements based on the tolerance, the shipper will probably accept the latter
although he believes he shipped with less damage. On the other hand,
without a tolerance the railroads would continue to pay claims which in-
clude damage they did not cause. This may warrant an amendment allow-
ing the Commission to provide tolerances when reasonably justified,19 but
the present scope of § 20(11) precludes judicial modifications.
Corporations-
"SALE" INTERPRETED UNDER SECURITIES
EXCHANGE ACT § 16(b)
Pursuant to a plan to gain control of the Tide Water Associated Oil
Company, the Mission Corporation purchased a large percentage of Tide
Water common stock over a period of years. In two exchanges within
14. 253 U.S. 97 (1920). See text following note 7 supra.
15. 51 CONG. REc. 9621 (1914) ; Reider v. Thompson, 339 U.S. 113, 119 (1949);
Chicago, M. & St. Paul Ry. v. McCaull-Dinsmore Co., 260 Fed. 835, 837 (8th Cir.
1919), aff'd, 253 U.S. 97 (1920) ; 20 MicH. L. REv. 765, 770 (1922).
16. Claims for damage to shell eggs increased from about $110,000 in 1941 to
$2,338,462 in 1947. Instant case at 850.
17. In Cardwell v. Union Pac. R.R., 90 Kan. 707, 136 Pac. 244 (1913) the court
took judicial notice of the natural shrinkage of grain and automatically subtracted
the allowance fixed by state statute and even permitted the jury to increase this
amount. But cf. Smith v. Louisville & N. R.R., 202 Iowa 292, 209 N.W. 465 (1926).
18. Joeph Toker Co. v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 12 N.J. 608, 97 A.2d 598 (1953).
19. See, e.g., the Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act: "A food shall be deemed
to be misbranded . . . (e) If in package form unless it bears a label containing . . .
(2) an accurate statement of the quantity of the contents in terms of weight, measure,
or numerical count: Provided, That under clause (2) of this paragraph reasonable
variations shall be permitted, and exemptions as to small packages shall be established,
by regulations prescribed by the Secretary." 52 STAT. 1047 (1938), as amended,
21 U.S.C. §343 (Supp. 1952).
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twenty-five months, Mission transferred its Tide Water stock to a sub-
sidiary holding company established for that purpose and received in re-
turn two shares of the subsidiary's stock for each share of Tide Water
stock.' Both transactions were approved by the SEC under the Invest-
ment Company Act of 1940.2 Between these exchanges, Mission declared
dividends with part of the stock received from the subsidiary, whereupon
that stock was publicly traded for the first time.3 The subsidiary's sole
asset consists of the Tide Water stock except for an insignificant amount
of cash; its only outstanding stock has been issued to the parent corpora-
tion in these exchanges. A stockholder's derivative action, on behalf of
the Tide Water Company, was instituted under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, § 16(b), 4 to recover profits realized by Mission through the
purchase and sale of Tide Water stock within a six month period.5 The
court held that the first exchange of stock was merely a transfer between
corporation pockets and not a "sale," but that the second exchange did
constitute a "sale" and the profit realized by Mission is recoverable by
Tide Water. Blau v. Mission Corp., 212 F.2d 77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
347 U.S. 1016 (1954).
Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act provides that any
profit realized by an officer, director or principal stockholder of a cor-
poration through purchase and sale or sale and purchase of the corpora-
tion's securities within a six month period shall be recoverable by the cor-
poration.0 The crucial issue in the instant case was whether or not the
two exchanges were "sales" by Mission. For purposes of the entire Act,
Congress has defined "sale" as "any contract to sell or otherwise dispose
of." 7 The only two cases under § 16(b) that faced the issue of "sale"
decided that a gift of securities does not fall within the definition.8 An
analogy might be drawn from Parke & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte 9 which
1. The amount of Tide Water stock involved in these two exchanges comprised
approximately 38.5% of its outstanding stock.
2. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(a), 17(b) (1952). The SEC consideration did not imply
approval under § 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1952),
which is administered by the courts. See text at note 19 infra.
3. The two dividends included approximately 40.4% of the subsidiary's outstanding
stock at that time.
4. 15 U.S.C. §78p(b) (1952).
5. Less than 17.5% of Mission Corporation's total purchases of Tide Water stock
occurred within six months of either exchange.
6. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1952). The defendant corporation in the instant case
is held to come within the provisions of this section through ownership of more than
10% of any class of any equity security of Tide Water. In order to reach such a
decision it was necessary to consider Mission's indirect interest in Tide Water through
its relationship with the subsidiary. The district court held that if the insider status
of the defendant depended upon its relation to the subsidiary, the exchange of stock
with the subsidiary was not a "sale." Blau v. Mission Corp., 113 F. Supp. 153
(S.D.N.Y. 1953).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (14) (1952). See Note, The Scope of "Purchase and Sale"
under Section 16(b) of the Exchange Act, 59 YALE L.J. 510 (1950). "
8. Shaw v. Dreyfus, 172 F.2d 140 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 907 (1949);
Truncale v. Blumberg, 80 F. Supp. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
9. 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947).
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held that the receipt of common stock through exercise of the convertible
feature of preferred stock was a "purchase." The court's language is broad
enough to include any conversion of securities. However, comment on
the decision has criticized the scope of the language while approving the
holding on the basis of the imminent compulsory redemption of the con-
vertible stock at a price considerably below the value of the stock re-
ceived.1 The instant case contains no similar factor to interfere with the
normal tendency of such closely related securities to fluctuate together
in value.
The present court's decision expresses the fear that the stocks of Tide
Water and the subsidiary may change in value simultaneously, but in
opposite directions. While such a situation is possible and would afford
an opportunity for abuse of inside information, it seems less likely to
result from normal economic factors than from manipulative practices
which are made unlawful by other provisions of the Act." It is more
probable that a change in value of the Tide Water stock will be reflected
proportionately in the holding company stock so long as its sole asset con-
tinues to be Tide Water stock.12  With these two stocks fluctuating to-
gether, the defendant, presumably not intending to abuse inside informa-
tion,13 has developed a technique which might be used to evade statutory
liability. A hypothetical speculator, with inside information of an impend-
ing rise of Tide Water stock, for example, could purchase Tide Water
stock and exchange it for subsidiary stock, as the defendant did here, and
then sell the subsidiary stock immediately after the expected rise.14 No
§ 16(b) liability could be found by matching the transactions at the ends
of such a cycle inasmuch as the statute clearly applies to trading with an
10. Note, 59 YALE L.J. 510, 526 (1950); 42 ILL. L. REv. 658 (1947). But see
59 HARV. L. Rav. 998 (1946).
11. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i, 78j (1952).
12. The SEC has exercised its rule making power under § 16(b) to exempt from
liability transactions in which stockholders of a non-diversified holding company
redeem their stock for that of the operating company. Rule X-16B-5, 17 CODE FED.
REGS. § 240.16b-5 (Cum. Supp. 1953). While this rule is inapplicable to the present
case because it is limited to officers and directors and concerns only redemption
transactions, it involves a comparable relationship of stocks which the SEC describes
as "substantially and in practical effect equivalents." 17 SEC ANN. REP. 57 (1951)..
This is borne out by the market fluctuations of the two stocks in the instant case.
From 1949 through 1951 the average price of the subsidiary stock (computed as an
average of annual high and low quotations) increased 7%8. During the same period,
the average price of Tide Water stock rose 15 9/16, or 7 25/32 per share of the sub-
sidiary stock on the 2:1 ratio. A semi-monthly check of New York Times stock
quotations from March 1949 through March 1950 shows the same close relationship
during the short-run.
13. The court notes the purpose of Mission Corporation to gain control of the
Tide Water Associated Oil Company. Instant case at 79. However, this fact is not
relevant to the issue of liability, for the statute is specifically stated to be applicable
regardless of actual or intended abuse of inside information. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b)
(1952).
14. The same effect can be obtained by a purchase of holding company stock,
an exchange and then sale of Tide Water stock. However, should the market values
be on a down-swing, there would be no need for an exchange since the first trans-
action would be a sale followed by a purchase of the other security at its lowest
point
1954]
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equity security of a single corporation.'6 The only way to prevent this
evasion is to hold the middle exchange transaction to be a sale of one stock
and purchase of the other. There are, however, practical difficulties which
would impair the use of such an evasive technique. It is unlikely that an
insider would create the necessary corporate relationship for such a pur-
pose alone.16 Much less complex stratagems, such as staying outside the
six months limit, are available to the intentional evader. A further obstacle
is the possible requirement of approval of the exchange by the SEC under
the Investment Company Act of 1940.17 Although the utility of such a
plan is dubious, the court's decision has eliminated the profit motive when
the holding company stock has an established market value.'8
Despite this analysis supporting the holding of the instant case, there
was no intimation that the defendant either abused or intended to abuse
inside information. The series of transactions occurred over a period of
years with ample notice and opportunity for other Tide Water stockholders
to protect their interests. A case of this type raises a question of the
manner in which the section is administered. The federal courts, rather
than the SEC, have the responsibility of enforcement. 19 A stockholder
derivative action can be brought by any owner of an equity security of
the corporation even though he purchased the security after the com-
plained of transaction 20 Whether the plaintiff is the corporation or one
of its shareholders, the money recovered inures to the corporation, but
the courts have awarded liberal attorney's fees in the derivative actions to
provide a more tangible incentive to outside stockholders.2 1 The combina-
tion of the simplicity of acquiring standing to sue and the reward of
ample fees if successful may be an undesirable temptation to some to insti-
gate actions under § 16(b) which do not fall within the purposes of the
statute.
15. The statute refers to trading "of any equity security of such issuer," (i.e. cor-
poration). 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1952). It is questionable whether the statute could
be applied to transactions involving two types of securities of one corporation. Cook
and Feldman, Insider Trading Under the Securities Exchange Act, 66 HARv. L. REv.
385, 624-25 (1953); Rubin and Feldman, Statutory Inhibitions Upon Unfair Use of
Corporate Information by Insiders, 95 U. OF PA. L. REv. 468, 486-87 (1947). Cf.
Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 237 n.13 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S.
751 (1943). But the language of the statute makes it clearly inapplicable to trans-
actions with stocks of two different corporations.
16. Other factors may make it practical to establish such a new corporation, as
in the instant case, or the necessary relationship may already be in existence.
17. This requirement will not involve SEC consideration in terms of § 16(b)
liability, but it will nonetheless bring the entire transaction to the attention of the SEC,
delay completing the cycle, and may result in some undesired publicity of the plan.
18. There is still a possibility of using this plan before the holding company stock
is traded since the court did not find liability in that situation.
19. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1952) ; American Distilling Co. v. Brown, 295 N.Y. 36,
64 N.E.2d 347 (1945). See letter from Myer Feldman, Esq., Special Counsel, SEC,
dated Sept. 1, 1954, on file in Biddle Law Library, University of Pennsylvania Law
School.
20. Benisch v. Cameron, 81 F. Supp. 882 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
21. This policy was adopted in the first case under § 16(b) : Smolowe v. Delendo
Corp., 136 F2d 231, 241 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943).
22. See Magida on behalf of Vulcan Detinning Co. v. Continental Can Co., 12
F.R.D. 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), where an effort to disclose the motive for the action
and plaintiff's relationship with his attorney was thwarted. And see Magida v. Con-
tinental Can Co., 12 F.R.D. 400 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
RECENT CASES
Maritime Law-
SURVIVAL OF ACTION UNDER JONES ACT AGAINST
ESTATE OF DECEASED TORTFEASOR
A seaman perished when the private yacht on which he was employed
foundered on the high seas. His administrator sued the representatives
of the estates of the owners, who had been residents of Florida, in a joint
action on the law side I of the federal district court in Florida under the
Jones Act 2 and the Florida Survival Statute.3 The district judge dis-
missed the action because of plaintiff's admitted failure to file notice of his
claim within the time required by the Florida Probate Act.4 The circuit
court reversed, holding that the Jones Act does not provide for the sur-
vivability of a cause of action against the estate of a deceased tortfeasor,
but the right of action granted by the Jones Act survived by operation of
the Florida Survival Statute, and that the applicable statute of limitation
was that of the Jones Act rather than the Florida probate provision. Roth
v. Cox, 210 F.2d 76 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 347 U.S. 1009 (1954).
An action under the Jones Act was held to survive the death of a
tortfeasor in Nordquist v. United States Trust Co. of New York 5 on the
theory that, since the Federal Employer's Liability Act,6 which was in-
corporated in the Jones Act, provided for the survival of actions against
receivers or others charged with the duty of the management of a common
carrier,7 failure to imply a survivorship provision in the Jones Act would
conflict with this expressed policy of giving a plaintiff a remedy where
the tortfeasor no longer exists. The instant court rejected this position 8
specifically and permitted the action to survive by operation of the state
survival statute as a "common law remedy" within the meaning of the
saving clause of the Federal Judiciary Act.9 The "common law remedy"
refers only to the use of the state court as a forum for the enforcement
of maritime rights and to the use of common law forms of action,'0 and all
of the previously reported decisions had so used the clause.,- The appro-
1. To be distinguished from the admiralty side of the federal court. State courts
may also entertain maritime cases. See text at note 10 infra.
2. 41 STAT. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §688 (1952).
3. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 45.11 (Supp. 1953).
4. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 733.16 (Supp. 1953).
5. 188 F.2d 776 (2d Cir. 1951) (A. Hand, J., joined by L. Hand and Clark, JJ.);
see 30 TEXAs L. Rxv. 510 (1952).
6. 53 STAT. 1404 (1939), 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1952).
7. Id. § 57.
8. Instant case at 78, 79.
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1952). This section changed the phraseology but not the
intent of the ninth section of the Judiciary Act of 1789 whereby the district courts
of the United States were given exclusive original jurisdiction of all civil causes of
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, "saving to suitors in all cases the right of a
common-law remedy where the common law is competent to give it," as made clear
by the reviser's note.
10. Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372 (1918). See 47 CoL. L. REv.
1364 (1947).
11. See, e.g., C. J. Hendry Co. v. Moore, 318 U.S. 133 (1926); Panama R.R.
v. Vasquez, 271 U.S. 557 (1926); Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S.
109 (1924) ; Knapp, Stout & Co. v. McCaffrey, 177 U.S. 638 (1899) ; Schoonmaker v.
Gilmore, 102 U.S. 118 (1880); Steamboat Co. v. Chase, 16 Wall. 522 (U.S. 1872).
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priateness of invoking the saving clause in the instant case is therefore
questionable since this case does not turn on the form of the action or
the forum. However, all three forums for the litigation of maritime rights
have enforced state wrongful death and survival statutes in maritime tort
actions not based on the Jones Act,'2 whether the tort was committed
within the territorial limits of the state '3 or, as in this case, on the high
seas,14 either on the basis of federal adoption of state law 15 or the power
of a state to create rights and liabilities in a local situation.'8 Whatever
the basis for invoking state law, the particular question raised by the
instant case is whether a state survival statute is enforceable in a suit under
the Jones Act or whether it 17 is excluded by that Act. Lindgren v.
United States held the Jones Act paramount to and exclusive of the
operation of a state wrongful death statute, which is difficult to distinguish
from a survival statute. It may be argued, however, that Lindgren is
distinguishable from the instant case. Since the Jones Act mentions ex-
plicitly actions on behalf of a deceased plaintiff, all state statutes in conflict
with its provisions must fall; but the Jones Act does not mention spe-
cifically actions against a deceased defendant, so perhaps state survival
statutes remain enforceable in suits under it. Before this conclusion is
accepted, the interest of the Federal Government in the uniformity of
maritime law ' 8 must be weighed against its interest in protecting sea-
men and their families.' 9 In maritime tort actions not brought under
the Jones Act, the Supreme Court has held that enforcement of a state
12. just v. Chambers, 312 U.S. 383 (1941); Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257
U.S. 233 (1921); The Hamilton, 207 U.S. 398 (1907); The Harrisburg, 119 U.S.
199 (1886) ; Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U.S. 99 (1876) ; Steamboat Co. v. Chase, 16 Wall.
552 (U.S. 1872) ; Continental Casualty Co. v. The Benny Skou, 200 F.2d 246 (4th
Cir. 1952); Rose v. United States, 73 F. Supp. 759 (E.D.N.Y. 1947); The City of
Norwalk, 55 Fed. 98 (S.D.N.Y. 1893).
13. The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886).
14. The Hamilton, 207 U.S. 398 (1907).
15. Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233 (1921); Workman v. Mayor of
New York, 179 U.S. 552 (1900) ; The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886); Rose v.
United States, 73 F. Supp. 759 (E.D.N.Y. 1947).
16. Standard Dredging Corp. v. Murphy, 319 U.S. 306 (1943) ; Just v. Chambers.
312 U.S. 383 (1941) ; Grant Smith-Porter Ship Co. v. Rohde, 257 U.S. 469 (1922) ;
The Hamilton, 207 U.S. 398 (1907); Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U.S. 99 (1876); The
Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 558 (U.S. 1874) ; Continental Casualty Co. v. The Benny Skou,
200 F.2d 246 (4th Cir. 1952); The City of Norwalk, 55 Fed. 98 (S.D.N.Y. 1893) ;
cf. Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352 (1913) ; Cooley v. Board of Wardens of Po4t
of Philadelphia, 12 How. 298 (U.S. 1851).
17. 281 U.S. 38 (1930). The deceased seaman had no kin dependent upon him
so as to come within the terms of the F.E.L.A.
18. Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239 (1942) ; Knickerbocker Ice
Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920); Union Fish Co. v. Erickson, 248 U.S. 308
(1919); Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 215 (1917); Workman v. Mayor of
New York, 179 U.S. 552 (1900); Frame v. City of New York, 34 F. Supp. 194
(S.D.N.Y. 1940); cf. Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372 (1918); Second
Employers' Liability Cases (Mondou v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R.), 223 U.S. 1
(1912); The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 558 (U.S. 1874). But see Atlee v. Packet Co.,
21 Wall. 389, 396 (U.S. 1874).
19. See Cosmopolitan Shipping Co. v. McAllister, 337 U.S. 783 (1949); Aguilar
v. Standard Oil Co. of N.J., 318 U.S. 724 (1943).
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wrongful death or survival statute does not abrogate the federal policy
of uniformity.20 There seems no reason for reversing this doctrine, and
the interest of protecting the rights of seamen should prevail.
Assuming that the state survival statute may be applied in a mari-
time case under the Jones Act, would the controlling limitation on the
time within which to bring the action be the eight months' period of the
Florida Probate Act or the three years allowed in the Jones Act? The
Supreme Court has held consistently in actions not under the Jones Act
that when the state wrongful death statute gave the plaintiff the right to
sue, the state limitation controlled,21 and these cases should govern a sur-
vival action. On the other hand, perhaps those cases are distinguishable
because they involved laches, 22 not a federal statute with an explicit limita-
tion. Trying to decide this question on the basis of which act provides
the "right" and which act provides the "remedy" can be unrewarding,
since both have been held to be "substantive rights." 24 Evaluating the
practical considerations, application of the state period would achieve uni-
formity of limitation on all suits against decedent's estates within a par-
ticular state and encourage orderly and expeditious settlement.2 5 The
federal period of limitation would promote the more important objectives
of national uniformity of limitation on all suits brought under the Jones
Act and the protection of seamen from the possibility of being foreclosed
from suit in the happen-stance of injury and hospitalization in a foreign
port.
28
Both this court and the Nordquist court 2 7 found justifications to per-
mit an action under the Act to survive. The Nordquist solution seems
preferable in that it avoids the problems involved in enforcing state laws
in maritime cases, 28 and protects seamen and their families since recovery
need not depend on whether or not a state has a survival statute.29
20. See note 11 supra. See 29 CALF. L. Raw. 519 (1941).
21. Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233 (1921); The Harrisburg, 119 U.S.
199 (1886); Continental Casualty Co. v. The Benny Skou, 200 F.2d 246 (4th Cir.
1952); Rose v. United States, 73 F. Supp. 759 (E.D.N.Y. 1947).
22. Rose v.. United States, 73 F. Supp. 759 (E.D.N.Y. 1947). Implicit in cases
cited note 21 supra.
23. Compare Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945), with Holmberg
v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392 (1946).
24. Compare Cosmopolitan Shipping Co. v. McAllister, 337 U.S. 783 (1949),
with Just v. Chambers, 312 U.S. 383 (1941).
25. Brooks v. Federal Land Bank of Columbia, 106 Fla. 412, 143 So. 749 (1932).
26. For support of this conclusion see Engel v. Davenport, 271 U.S. 33 (1926).
27. See note 5 suPra.
28. 47 COL. L. Rav. 1364 (1947).
29. See Oppenheim, The Survival of Tort Actions and the Action for Wrongful
Death--A Survey and a Proposal, 16 TULANE L. REv. 386 (1942).
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Selective Service--
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FINDING ON CREDIBILITY
DETERMINATIVE OF CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR
CLASSIFICATION
Defendant was classified I-A by his local draft board, despite his
claim that he was a Jehovah's Witness.1 His record showed that one
of his parents was a Jehovah's Witness, one a Lutheran; that they were
separated and he spent part of his time with each; that in 1946 he had
listed his religious preference as Lutheran; that he had joined Jehovah's
Witnesses three months before he registered for the draft in 1948. A
hearing was held by the Department of Justice,2 and on its recommendation
the district appeal board granted defendant a conscientious objector classifi-
cation, but he appealed to the national board for the additional exemption
of minister.3 The national board reclassified him I-A, and he was con-
victed in the district court for refusing to submit to induction.4 On appeal
the circuit court reversed, holding that the national board, acting solely
on a paper record which did not contradict defendant's evidence, could
not override on "suspicion and speculation" the judgment of the Depart-
ment of Justice as to the credibility of the defendant. United States v.
Hagaman, 213 F.2d 86 (3d Cir. 1954). 5
The Supreme Court, in Dickinson v. United States,0 held that a regis-
trant whose evidence placed him prima fade within a claimed ministerial
exemption, could not be given a different classification by his local board
based solely on failure to believe his testimony. The stated test, not fur-
ther defined,7 was that a board needed "some affirmative evidence" to
support its classification, but subsequent cases have interpreted Dickinson
as requiring boards to build a record.8 The instant case adds to this burden.
1. The professed creed of Jehovah's Witnesses can sustain a claim of conscientious
objection. United States v. Hartman, 209 F.2d 366 (2d Cir. 1954) ; Taffs v. United
States, 208 F.2d 329 (8th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 928 (1954).
2. 62 STAT. 612 (1948), as amended, 65 STAT. 86 (1951), 50 U.S.C. §456(j)
(1952).
3. Conscientious objectors opposed to both combatant and non-combatant service
are required to perform civilian work, for a prescribed period, which contributes
to the maintenance of the national health, safety or interest. Ibid.
4. "[A]ny person who . . . evades or refuses registration or service in the
armed forces . . . shall, upon conviction in any district court of the United States
of competent jurisdiction, be punished by imprisonment for not more than five years
or a fine of not more than $10,000, or by both such fine and imprisonment. . .
62 STAT. 622 (1948), 50 U.S.C. §462(a) (1952).
5. The court also held that if the registrant is sincere in his belief, Jehovah's
Witnesses are entitled to the exemption of conscientious objector. Instant case
at 89.
6. 346 U.S. 389 (1953).
7. "The task of courts in cases such as this is to search the record for some
affirmative evidence to support the local board's overt or implicit finding... ." 346
U.S. at 396.
8. Jewell v. United States, 208 F.2d 770 (6th Cir. 1953) ; Pine v. United States,
212 F.2d 93 (4th Cir. 1954). This was the view which the dissenting Justices held
of the majority's position. Dickinson v. United States, 346 U.S. 389, 397 (1953).
RECENT CASES
To build a record now, local boards apparently must locate witnesses
who know a registrant and who will express their personal disbelief in
his sincerity,9 for it would be difficult to find extrinsic facts which would
present more valid support for the opinion of the local board than those
in Hagaman. Whether a registrant qualifies for a ministerial exemption is
largely a question of fact and the Dickinson rule of affirmative evidence
to support a board's refusal to classify IV-E is valid. But where the
crucial issue is a registrant's sincerity and veracity, and outside evidence
supports the inference that he is not sincere, the Hagaman requirement
invalidates a local board's judgment as to credibility. This distinction
explains an apparent contradiction between the two cases-that demeanor
evidence "I was insufficient to support the finding of the local board in
Dickinson, but was made the controlling factor in sustaining the De-
partment of Justice in Hagaman."
The basic problem presented by Hagan= is why the Department of
Justice finding on credibility should have been accepted as final by the
court and that of the local board ignored with no discussion at all. This
seems inconsistent with the Universal Military Training and Service Act,
which provides that "[t] he appeal board shall . . . give consideration to,
but shall not be bound to follow, the recommendation of the Department
of Justice . .. 12 In United States v. Nugent,13 the Supreme Court
held that a fair hearing before the Department of Justice entitled a regis-
trant to only a fair resume of any adverse evidence gathered by the FBI,
on the theory that neither the Department's hearing nor investigation is
the determinative factor in the classification of a registrant, that they are
only auxiliary procedures." Yet not only do appeal boards follow the
Department's recommendation in most cases,' 5 but at least one court had
discarded the auxiliary rationale and held that the district appeal board's
9. After classification the registrant can appear in person before the local board
if he so requests and the board in its discretion can permit any person to appear on
behalf of the registrant. 32 CODE FE. R.ns. §§ 1624.1-24.3 (Cum. Supp. 1954).
10. See NLRB v. Dinion Coil Co., 201 F.2d 484, 487-90 (2d Cir. 1952) (a dis-
cussion of demeanor evidence).
11. ". . . [Sluch rejection of testimony would have reflected the antithesis
of the normal and proper unwillingness of a reviewing agency, which has not heard
a witness, to reverse a judgment as to his credibility." Instant case at 90.
12. See note 2 supra.
13. 346 U.S. 1 (1953).
14. The auxiliary status of the Department of Justice hearings has also been
questioned by a group of cases which sustain a registrant's right to see the full
FBI report at his trial for failure to submit to induction, on the ground that he
is entitled to prove whether or not he received a "fair resume." This seems in-
consistent with the narrow view of the hearing taken in United States v. Nugent,
346 U.S. 1 (1953). See United States v. Evans, 115 F. Supp. 340 (D. Conn.
1953) ; United States v. Stasevic, 117 F. Supp. 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) ; United States
v. Fisher, Crim. No. 6283, D.N.H., March 16, 1954; United States v. Stull, Crim.
No. 5634, E.D. Va., Nov. 6, 1953.
15. Down to June 30, 1944, 11,313 cases were referred to the Department of
Justice and recommendations were rendered in 8,447 of these. Available statistics
on 8,126 cases show that boards of appeal followed such recommendations in 16
out of 17 cases (94.2%). SIBLEY AND JACOB, CONSCRIM'ON OF CONSCIENCE 75-76
(1952).
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ruling is arbitrary if the board refuses to follow the report without giving
the reasons therefor.1 The importance of the Department of Justice
hearing to the registrant, and the finality accorded its decisions by the
appeal boards and courts, in spite of the statute, can be justified on the
pragmatic ground that a more accurate classification will result.' 7 First,
prejudice against conscientious objectors, which often may bias local boards,
is less likely to influence hearing officers. Also the investigation by the
FBI is far more detailed and complete than any a local board could make,
thus making the hearings more thorough. In addition, the hearings are
conducted on a more formal level and the registrant is entitled to the
services of a lawyer.
The close supervision which courts now give conscientious objector
claims probably stems from the limited peacetime draft. One danger of
circumvention of local boards, as in Hagaman, is that the law formulated
during limited conscription may prove unworkable in the event of total
mobilization, and result in a burden upon the courts and the Department
of Justice. However, the actual number of conscientious objector claims
does not seem to support this view.' 8  The tendency of local boards to
shift the burden of classification to the Department of Justice was existent
before the courts ever entered the field.' 9 The argument that the present
procedure gives conscientious objectors more favorable treatment than other
registrants is met by the point that the basic decision to recognize a man's
conscience has been made, and to carry out this difficult task, special pro-
cedures are needed. If Congress reconsiders the problem posed by Haga-
man and Nugent and attempts to bring the Act and its practical interpre-
tation into harmony,20 it should clarify the scope and status of the De-
partment of Justice hearing. If this is to be the determinative hearing,
as seems desirable, the registrant should be allowed to see the full FBI
report, not just a summary, and there should be a limited scope of review
by appeal boards and courts.
Later figures, down to June 30, 1946, indicate that boards of appeal followed
the recommendations of the Department of Justice as to category I-A-O and IV-E
in 79.5% of the cases recommended. SELECTIVE SERVICE SPECIA. MONOGRAPH No.
11, CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION 147 (Vol. 1 1950).
16. United States v. Lynch, 115 F. Supp. 735 (S.D. Cal. 1953). See Pine v.
United States, 212 F.2d 93 (4th Cir. 1954).
17. "Great weight must be given to the F. B. I. investigation, as there is no
reason to assume that its report is anything but factual and entirely unbiased and un-
prejudiced." United States v. Lynch, 115 F. Supp. 735, 738 (S.D. Cal. 1953).
18. For the years 1948 through August, 1954, the Department of Justice has
made recommendations to the appeal boards in 5897 cases. Letter from T. Oscar
Smith, Esq., Special Assistant to the Attorney General, dated September 28, 1954,
on file in Biddle Law Library, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
19. SIBLEY AND JACOB, CONSCRIPTION OF CONscIENcE 60 (1952). Lending sup-
port to this theory is the fact that out of 8,126 cases the local boards denied ob-
jector's claims in 6,228 instances (76.4%) while the Department recommended denial
in only 2,997 instances (36.7%) and the board of appeals denied the claims in
3,222 instances (39.4%). Id. at 75-76.
20. But see Russell, Development of Conscientious Objector Recognitio in thw
United States, 20 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 409, 446 (1952), where the author states that
the present legislation as to conscientious objectors appears to be closest to a faii"
and equitable solution.
